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SUMMARY 
India's far-reaching civil service pension reforms in 2008 provided its fragmented and diffuse pension 
system a unifying organizing framework. The design and architecture of the reformed civil service 
program, the National Pension System, was subsequently extended to those employed in private 
formal and informal sectors. The article assesses India's pension reforms and identifies challenges for 
the National Pension System in providing old-age income security. The article also presents estimates 
for universal social pension scheme and argues that its implementation is constrained by political 
factors and not necessarily by fiscal constraints. 
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Introduction 
As many countries in developing Asia, including India are expected to age at relatively low incomes, 
financing retirement expenditure is a significant policy challenge. However, ensuring retirement 
income adequacy for an increasing number of elderly has received limited attention in policy debates 
in India. Estimates suggest that in 2050, the two largest population cohorts in India will be women 
aged 70 years and older followed by men aged 70 years and older (United Nations, 2010). The number 
of elderly (defined as those 60 years and older) will more than triple between 2010 and 2050, from 93 
million to 296 million; while as a share of the population, it will increase from 7.7 per cent in 2010 to 
18.3 per cent in 2050. The number of elderly (and near elderly) for whom retirement income security 
will become economically, and politically significant will increase sharply. 
Moreover, other factors such as urbanization, migratory and informal labor markets, lack of social 
safety nets, and reduced economic growth and fiscal space to finance social expenditure in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis also portend many challenges for India's elderly. Although India's 
labor force is predominantly informal, current pension arrangements cover only those employed in 
formal private and public sectors. Thus, the elderly have been forced to rely on voluntary savings and 
traditional familial structures and institutions to finance their retirement expenditure. 
India's civil service pension program is perhaps one of the most generous programs available to civil 
servants across low-middle economies. The non-contributory program offers benefits that are indexed 
to current wages and provides protection against inflationary, longevity, and survivors' risks. Not 
surprisingly, the fiscal cost of the program exceeded 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2012–2013. Primarily driven by fiscal pressures, the government initiated far-reaching civil service 
pension reforms in 2008, moving all new civil service personnel recruited after January 2004 to a 
defined contribution (DC) program called the National Pension System (NPS), supervised by an 
independent regulatory authority. The design of the NPS included portability of benefits, centralized 
recordkeeping, investment exposure in varied asset classes, and innovations in the design of the 
payout phase and was a significant departure from the traditional civil service pension scheme. In 
2009, the government extended the NPS architecture on a voluntary basis to those employed in the 
private (formal and informal) sectors. 
The focus of this article is to assess India's pension reforms, focusing on the architecture that 
undergirds the NPS. This article will argue that as most governments implement reforms to integrate 
generous civil service pension programs with the national pension arrangements, India's far-reaching 
civil service pension reforms have come to be a focal point to anchor fragmented pension 
arrangements for the rest of the society, including those in the informal sector. Efforts to expand 
coverage are encumbered by a predominant informal labor force and resistance from the erstwhile 
monopoly provider and regulator of pension products to the private sector, the Employees Provident 
Fund Organization (EPFO). The efficacy of India's pension reforms lie in its ability to overcome 
EPFO and extend the NPS design to formal private sector, to maintain high density of contributions of 
its co-contributory scheme for the informal sector, and to expand the role of social pensions. The 
article concludes by projecting the fiscal cost of a universal social pension, and argues that its 
implementation is constrained by political factors rather than fiscal or institutional constraints. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the various components of 
India's pension system. Assessing India's Pension Reforms Section assesses recent pension reforms, 
followed by challenges faced by NPS in the Existing Challenges Section. The last section concludes 
the article. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF INDIA'S PENSION SYSTEM 
India's pension system has evolved over time without an overarching universal program and with 
limited regulation, governance, and coordination (Asher, 2009). There are three major components of 
the pension system, namely, the mandatory EPFO, which covers those employed in the formal private 
sector firms with more than 20 employees; the Civil Service Pension Scheme, which covers central 
and state government employees; and lastly, diffuse arrangements by central and state governments to 
cover the Elderly Poor and Informal Sector Workers.1 Each of these components is in turn discussed 
below. 
Employees Provident Fund Organization 
The EPFO is an unusual national provident fund as it administers two separate schemes, combines the 
roles of service provider with regulatory functions in one organization, and finally because it 
constitutes one of the largest non-bank financial institutions in India. The two schemes are the 
following: (i) a DC scheme, Employees' Provident Fund, and (ii) a defined benefit (DB) scheme, the 
Employees' Pension Scheme (EPS). The contribution for the EPS is 9.49 per cent of the covered wage 
and is shared by the employer (8.38%) and the government (1.16%). The benefits are based according 
to a formula that takes into account average salary of the last 12 months and the length of service. As 
both the contributions and the benefits are defined, adjusting long-term assets and liabilities of EPS is 
a challenging task. The combined contribution rate for all EPFO schemes is 25.7 per cent of members' 
wages (EPFO, 2012), which is considered to be relatively high. 
In March 2012, after being in operation for 60 years, the EPF scheme covered 691 000 establishments 
and had 85.5 million members, of whom about half are considered to be active members, those 
contributing regularly during any given year (EPFO, 2012). The active members would hence 
constitute about one-twelfth of the labor force. The annual contributions to EPFO schemes in 2011–
2012 were INR 700bn, equivalent to only 0.79 per cent of GDP (EPFO, 2012). 
The EPFO combines the role of provident and pension fund administrator with that of a regulator of 
funds that are exempted from the EPFO Act.2 Those corporations seeking exemption from the EPFO 
are usually large with above average wage rates. There is a conflict of interest in EPFO as a service 
provider granting exemptions as the exempted funds could provide competition with regard to the 
EPFO in investment allocation and management, and in quality of services provided to members. 
The EPFO, for example, requires that the exempted funds allocate balances in exactly the same 
manner as the EPFO and that they provide at least the same rate of return to members as the EPF. 
Such requirements work against innovations in asset allocation strategies, which could benefit the 
members. The EPFO is among the largest non-banking financial institutions in India with assets of 
over INR 5461bn in 2011, equivalent to 6.1 per cent of India's GDP (INR 88 558bn) 
(EPFO, 2012).3 While its absolute size is large, given that it has been in existence since 1952 and 
considering its high contribution rates, EPFO's pension assets as share of GDP are relatively small. 
The nominal interest rate on EPFO balances averaged 10.49 per cent per annum during the 1990–
2011 period. The real rate of return per annum during the aforementioned period was, however, 3.51 
per cent, implying doubling of real balances every 20 years. EPFO's assets are primarily in public 
sector debt instruments. A provident fund that invests nearly all of its assets in gilts (government 
bonds or treasury bills that pay a fixed rate of interest and are considered low risk) and does not take 
advantage of trading opportunities will forego prospects to benefit its members by more professional 
portfolio management. This may lead to a reduction in national savings to the extent that such a 
practice may weaken the government's fiscal discipline because of the availability of cheap funds. 
This defeats one additional objective of mandatory saving schemes, which is to facilitate the 
placement of these savings into productive investments that, in turn, can drive up the trend rate of 
economic growth, which further strengthens retirement income security (Barr and Diamond, 2008). 
As the coverage of the EPFO was very low and covered only the formal sector, in 1998, the Ministry 
of Welfare of the central government initiated the Old Age Social and Income Security (Project 
OASIS) to study options to expand coverage to those in the informal sector (Dave, 2006). Project 
OASIS recommended portable individual DC accounts, centralized recordkeeping, and a new 
independent regulator to ensure prudential oversight (Bordia and Bhardwaj, 2003). The EPFO lobbied 
the Ministry of Finance that it should implement the proposed DC scheme to cover the informal 
sector. In the final negotiations at the Ministry of Finance, the OASIS recommendations were not 
implemented, and individuals were encouraged to purchase DC pension plans from private firms 
(Dave, 2006). 
Civil service pension schemes 
Since India's independence in 1947, pension arrangements for civil servants (at all levels of 
government) have followed the DB method, with no contributions required from the employee (civil 
servants). The pension benefit is about half of the basic pay, payable on retirement upon reaching 
60 years of age, and is indexed annually to prices.4 Every 10 years, when the Pay Commission, a 
statutory body, reviews remuneration of civil servants, the pension benefits are adjusted. If a 
pensioner dies, survivors receive reduced benefits until death of the spouse. 
The pension expenditure of the central government increased from INR 101bn (0.5% of GDP) in 
1999–2000 to INR 632bn (0.6% of GDP) in 2012–2013, and the corresponding increase in the 
pension expenditure by all states combined increased from INR 251bn (1.2% of GDP in 1999–2000) 
to INR 1464bn (1.5% of GDP in 2012–2013).5 Thus, the combined civil service pension expenditure 
in 2012–2012 was 2.1 per cent of GDP for an estimated 17.5 million civil servants employed across 
central, state, quasi-government, and local bodies. While there is no data available on the number of 
retired civil service personnel, it is estimated that the total pool does not exceed 5 per cent of the labor 
force. Financing such large expenditures is particularly challenging for state governments with lower 
fiscal capacities. 
In addition to pension benefits, civil servants receive gratuity payments6, and they contribute to a 
provident fund, whose accumulated balances they can withdraw in a lump sum at retirement. Neither 
gratuity nor provident fund contributions are accumulated in separate funds designed to meet future 
liabilities. Instead, they are paid from current revenues, encouraging a soft budget constraint and 
inadequate recognition of the lifetime cost to the taxpayers of hiring additional civil servants. These 
arrangements imply that those government entities with limited fiscal capacities will find it 
particularly challenging to meet their pension and other liabilities. Because they must meet these 
liabilities as they are statutory, without reforming the current arrangements, there will be opportunity 
costs in terms of government expenditure foregone on priorities such as infrastructure, education, and 
health sectors. 
At the same time while the recommendations of Project OASIS were being deliberated, in response to 
these rising fiscal costs, the Ministry of Finance in 1999 instituted a High-level Expert Group to study 
the pension liability of the Government in India. Although the OASIS recommendations were 
dismissed, similar recommendations emerged for reforming civil service pensions were announced in 
2003. In 2004, an interim regulator, the Pension Fund Regulatory Development Authority (PFRDA) 
was established; however, it failed to receive legislative support in parliament till 2013 because of 
sharp political opposition from members of the then coalition government.7 
On 1 April 2008, the Government of India formally introduced the New (subsequently changed to 
National) Pension Scheme (NPS), which is a DC scheme as compared with the previous DB scheme, 
for civil servants joining service from 1 January 2004. The trade-off is that the phasing out of the 
previous DB scheme will occur over several decades as civil servants that joined prior to 2004 retired. 
The expectation, which has since been realized, was that once the Union government introduces the 
NPS, the state governments would also adopt the scheme. As states have differing fiscal capacities 
and were under pressure to finance current pension expenditure, they vociferously embraced the NPS. 
As of August 2013, 26 out of 28 states have notified their version of the NPS for their civil servants, 
but only 23 of them have been made operational. 
The total contribution rate for mandatory NPS is 20 per cent of monthly earnings, split equally 
between the employee and the government (as employer).8 The design of the NPS differed 
considerably to existing pension programs on many dimensions: the NPS was co-contributory (by 
both employers and employees), it allowed portability of benefits, permitting power of compound 
interest through long-term accumulation of funds, and offered a combination of lump sum and 
periodic income (through mandatory purchase of annuities for at least 40% of the accumulated 
balances) in retirement (Kim et al., 2012). 
Although there was opposition from political parties to the NPS as discussed earlier, there was 
remarkably little opposition from newly recruited civil servants being placed on the NPS. As of 
August 2013, there were 1.2 million Union government and 1.8 million State Government employees 
in the NPS for a total of 3.0 million mandatory members, constituting little more than one-eighth of 
the total government employees. The current accumulation of balances in the mandatory scheme is 
rather low, only about 0.3 per cent of GDP (Government of India, 2013b). However, as the number of 
contributors and their density of contributions (number of monthly contributions divided by the total 
lifetime covered months) increase, these assets will increase rapidly. 
The NPS offers a range of investment choices through indexed funds varying with risk–return 
preferences, including a default life cycle plan, which adjusts exposure in asset classes with age. 
While the pension is still payable at age 60 years, the NPS differs from the earlier scheme in its 
payout phase arrangements and restricting pre-retirement withdrawals. At least 40 per cent of the 
accumulated balances must be used to purchase an annuity, while the rest can be withdrawn as a lump 
sum.9 The NPS scheme therefore requires a robust annuity market, with appropriate financial products 
(such as long-term bonds) to match assets and liabilities in a prudential manner. 
Arrangements for elderly poor and informal sector workers 
Given that the formal sector schemes at best covers about a quarter of the work force, and perhaps a 
fifth of the elderly, an important avenue for broadening social protection coverage in India is through 
social pensions, benefits that are non-contributory and financed from the budget. Currently, the Indira 
Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS) is a means-tested scheme available to 
individuals older than 60 years of age and is financed by the central and state governments. The 
central government pays INR 200 per month for individuals older than 60 years and younger than 
80 years and INR 500 per month for those older than 80 years. State governments' top–up ranges 
between INR 200 and 1000 per month and varies with the fiscal and administrative capacities. The 
National Social Assistance Program indicates that in 2012, 16.8 million individuals or approximately 
16 per cent of individuals older than age 60 years received the IGNOAPS.10 
The IGNOAPS provides a very low benefit level and is less than 5 per cent of per capita income. For 
a universal social pension targeted to those older than age 60 years, which provided a benefit level of 
25 per cent of per capita income, the fiscal cost is estimated to be less than 2 per cent of GDP and 
about 12 per cent of average tax revenue. This is discussed in the Existing Challenges Section in 
greater detail. If coverage were to be expanded through a universal social pension, more fiscal funds 
would have to be mobilized. The administrative capacities to effectively implement a universal social 
pension in India would also need to evolve, suggesting that timing and expansion of the program must 
be calibrated with such capacities and with fiscal affordability.11 
As discussed earlier, the OASIS recommendations to increase coverage for the informal sector 
workers were not implemented. However, in 2009, the NPS design and architecture with suitable 
modifications was made available to all Indian citizens on a voluntary basis, whether in the formal or 
informal sector. Because the formal private sector is under the ambit of the EPFO scheme, the 
voluntary NPS is largely targeted to the informal sector workers.12 To encourage participation in the 
voluntary NPS, the government launched the Swavalamban scheme, with co-contributions by 
government for low-income individuals. As of end August 2013, Swavalamban had 2 million 
members (about two-fifths of the total NPS membership) but a total balance of only INR 6.5bn, less 
than 2 per cent of total balances in NPS. 
The efficacy of social assistance and pensions as well as co-contribution schemes depends on the 
fiscal capacity of the central government and the states and the efficiency with which individual state 
governments can deliver pension benefits. Thus, fiscal and public sector governance reforms are 
intricately linked with the broader use of such pension programs. 
 
ASSESSING INDIA'S PENSION REFORMS 
There are at least three nested levels at which pension reforms can be assessed. The first is at the 
system level and relates to the extent to which pension reforms contribute to overall policy 
coherence and coordination with other instruments in the social protection system. Policy coherence 
refers to mutually reinforcing and compatible policy actions by various agencies across different 
levels of governments,13 and coordination refers to the overall clarity in objectives, goals, and 
instruments used. In this context, India's pension system is also discussed vis-à-vis the World Bank 
five-pillar framework, a common underlying theme in this symposium. 
The second level relates to the extent to which the functional goals of any pension system are being 
met, that is, to smooth lifetime consumption, mitigate old-age poverty, and provide coverage against 
longevity, inflationary, and survivors' risks (Barr and Diamond, 2008). Lastly, at 
an administrative and operational level, the extent to which reforms lower administrative costs and 
improve efficiency in performing the core functions of any provident or pension fund can be assessed. 
The core functions of a pension or provident fund are the following: (i) reliable collection of 
contributions; (ii) payment of benefits; (iii) financial management and productive investment of 
provident and pension fund assets; (iv) recordkeeping mechanisms to support collection, payment, 
and financial activities; and (v) preparing of financial statements that can be audited (Ross, 2011). 
This section assesses India's pension reforms at three levels discussed here. 
 
Policy coherence and coordination 
Consistent with India's federal structure, its pension system has evolved gradually with individual 
programs being added in an ad hoc manner by both central and state governments (Asher, 2009). The 
pension system has lacked a universal program or national arrangement that undergirds the system. 
There has been limited regulatory or prudential oversight on various components of the pension 
system. This has resulted in limited coverage both in terms of the number of individuals and the level 
and range of risks covered. Presently, programs are administered by both central and state 
governments and by competing government agencies including the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Labour, and Ministry of Rural Development. 
In 2005, the World Bank published a multi-pillar (5) framework for pension systems and reform 
(Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). The objective of this framework was to provide a holistic approach to 
old-age income security. It essentially built on their three-pillar framework, which had largely ignored 
the needs of those employed in the informal sector and those with low lifetime earnings. The five 
pillars refer to the following: (i) ‘zero pillar’, a social pension financed from budgetary sources; (ii) 
‘first pillar’, a mandatory contribution-based DB scheme; (iii) ‘second pillar’, a mandatory DC plan 
with individual accounts; (iv) ‘third pillar’, a voluntary contribution plan; and (v) ‘fourth pillar’, 
comprising of informal support systems. The multi-pillar framework envisions a complementary role 
for each of the pillars in providing economic security for the elderly. 
A limitation of this framework is that even after adhering to it in designing a system, it does not say 
much about the efficacy or adequacy of these arrangements.14 This resonates with the Indian reform 
experience. Prior to the NPS reforms, those working in the formal private sector had access to the 
mandatory EPFO (first pillar), whereas larger organizations had their own pension plans that were 
exempt from the EPFO. Those employed in the military, government, and public sector enterprises 
had access to non-contributory DB schemes. While in principle, members could also contribute to 
optional DC-based pension products such as the Public Provident Fund (third pillar), these products 
play a very small role in India's pension system. 
Schemes for the informal sector such as voluntary community-based micro-insurance schemes also 
played a limited role (Shankar and Asher, 2011). Although there has always been a skeletal 
framework of some form of social assistance, through means-tested non-contributory social pensions, 
the benefit levels are meager. Moreover, as these are state schemes, there is considerable variation in 
the monetary value of the pension benefit. 
Effectively, India has relied on the first and fourth pillar in its pension system. Poor management of 
the public monopoly pension provider, the EPFO, has reduced efficacy of arrangements for the formal 
private sector, and the poor design of plans for public sector personnel resulted in ballooning statutory 
government expenditure: the government's pension bill was nearly three times its spending on 
healthcare services in 2012. India has traditionally relied on informal social support through large 
joint families, undergirded by filial piety, for old-age income security. However, with increasing 
urbanization, migration and declining fertility rates, the efficacy of these informal institutions is 
declining. Moreover, although informal mechanisms can supplement formal arrangements, they are 
not a substitute, as they were perceived in India.15 
The evolution of India's pension system mirrors reform experiences in many developing countries. 
Historically, similar to most social protection programs, pension coverage has increased at the margin, 
covering the most ‘effectively organized’ groups of people, at each iteration of the reform process. 
The most cohesive groups are the first to galvanize political attention and have their interests 
advanced. For example, elected public officials, bureaucrats, civil service personnel, employees of 
public sector organizations, teachers, railroad workers, and so on have historically been part of 
national pension arrangements in the initial years in most countries. However, the vast majority of 
India's population is employed in the informal sector, where extending pension coverage is 
challenging. 
While civil service pension programs are relatively more generous than similar occupational programs 
for those in the private sector across developing economies, there have been recent efforts to integrate 
the civil service pension program with the national pension arrangements (Asher and Bali, 2011; 
Takayama, 2011).16 However, in India, absent of any unifying national pension arrangement, the NPS 
architecture provides a much-needed platform to anchor its diffused and fragmented pension system. 
This is important as the NPS integrates civil service schemes for central and state government 
employees as well as those employed in the private formal and informal sectors. As participation in 
the NPS is voluntary for those employed in the private sector, the efficacy of the voluntary component 
in increasing retirement income security will depend on the number of individuals the NPS can enroll 
from the private sector and the density of their contributions. Although the NPS has tried to 
incentivize informal sector coverage through co-contribution schemes, it does not address concerns of 
the poor. This is discussed in the Existing Challenges Section. 
An important governance issue that needs to be addressed for greater coordination is the regulatory 
structure of India's pension system. The interim PFRDA has been made a statutory body in 2013 with 
the passing of the PFRDA Act in parliament with the mandate to provide systemic regulation and 
oversight of all components of the pension system (Asher, 2013). However, the EPFO is currently 
exempt from the ambit of the PFRDA. EPFO members should be given the option to participate in 
NPS. This would improve contestability of the EPFO and provide competition to the underperforming 
monopoly provider of pension products to the formal sector.17 
Functional goals: equity, adequacy, and sustainability 
Equity 
The fiscal cost to state and central governments for financing the pension expenditure of their retired 
personnel exceeded 2.1 per cent of GDP in 2012–2013. To put this spending in context relative to 
other economies, the average civil service pension spending in high-income Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies and non-OECD economies was 2.0 
and 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2006, respectively (Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006). Such high levels of 
spending were of course not only sustainable for a low middle-income economy such as India but also 
highly inequitable as civil servants accounted for less than 5 per cent of the labor force. The reforms 
will move all newly recruited civil servants to a DC scheme, which will therefore reduce the fiscal 
cost of the scheme in the long term and ameliorate the disparity between pension benefits for civil 
service personnel and for those employed in the private sector 
However, even under the current pension arrangements, the EPFO organized schemes enjoy favorable 
tax treatment relative to the NPS. The EPFO operates under an exempt-exempt-exempt structure, 
whereas the NPS receives an exempt-exempt-tax treatment. This uneven playing field can make the 
NPS potentially less attractive to buyers of pension products. 
Another aspect of equity relates to gender and the differing pension provision for women and men. 
Indian women have a lower labor force participation rate and do paid work for fewer years than men 
(Sastry, 2007). This trend is evident in both the formal and informal labor markets. If pension 
provision is indexed to wages or contributions without a system of risk pooling, it necessarily follows 
that women would have lower replacement rates than their counterparts. Aggravating this is the higher 
life expectancy of women, as a group, relative to men. The reforms do not do much to address the old-
age economic security of women. 
Adequacy 
Adequacy of pension arrangements can be viewed by the number of individuals covered and by the 
range of risks that they are insured against. The traditional pension arrangements for civil servants 
insured its members against longevity, inflation, and survivors' risks. The NPS requires mandatory 
annuitization of a significant share of the balances at retirement, which helps insure against longevity 
and mitigates some survivor risks. However, India's annuity market is relatively underdeveloped 
(Bloom et al., 2010; Asher and Vasudevan, 2011). Till the late 1990s, India's insurance market was 
dominated by government monopolies, which played a very conservative role in deepening India's 
capital and financial markets. 
The adequacy of the civil service pensions is in sharp contrast to those employed in the private sector. 
The EPFO, despite being in existence for nearly 60 years, covers less than 10 per cent of the 
population and less than one-sixth of its total labor force (EPFO, 2012). Although no official or other 
projections are available, it is a reasonable assumption to make that even when benefits from both 
EPF and EPS are combined, the expected replacement rates (ratio of pre-retirement to post-retirement 
income) for most of the members will be substantially lower than the 66–75 per cent recommended by 
the experts. For example, the average balance per member as at end March 2012 in the EPF scheme 
was INR 42 000 (only about three-fifths of per capita income).18 
A welcome initiative is the co-contribution, Swavalamban scheme to encourage voluntary 
participation in the NPS by those employed in the informal sector. Although the number of those who 
have enrolled in this show considerable promise, ensuring high density of contributions is a major 
challenge. As majority of the India's labor force is employed in the informal sector,19 both the 
voluntary NPS and the targeted co-contributory scheme for the informal poor will help increase 
pension coverage. 
Sustainability 
There are two issues with regard to sustainability in pension programs. The first relates to financial 
sustainability or the long-term matching of assets and liabilities. The second relates to economic 
sustainability or the capacity of the economy to finance projected liabilities without sacrificing 
economic growth or other priorities. In this context, the most important macroeconomic variable, 
which undergirds economic sustainability of pension programs, is the long-term trend in economic 
growth (Barr and Diamond, 2008). 
Sustainability in any DC-based pension system is intricately linked with adequacy of pension benefits. 
This is because in a DC system—in which contribution obligations are defined but the benefits 
depend on the accrued balances of contributions, interest income earned, extent of pre-retirement 
withdrawals, and outcomes of conversion of accumulated balances into a retirement income stream—
individual members bear the investment and macroeconomic risks, such as unemployment, relatively 
stagnant wages, or higher-than-anticipated inflation. 
Under the traditional civil service pension program, pension benefits were paid out of current 
government revenue and represented large unfunded contingent liabilities. Budgetary accounting 
practices that do not recognize accrued liabilities and make provisions to finance them essentially 
encourage a soft budget constraint and fiscal profligacy. It is also important to distinguish that 
prepayment does not necessarily imply that a pension system is funded. The extent to which increased 
mandatory savings by provident and pension funds crowd out or are the expense of voluntary savings, 
and results in lower national savings, it could undermine the economic sustainability of the pension 
system. A DC pension system can be understood to be funded when the contributions accumulated 
increase national savings and investment rates and foster higher economic growth (Barr and 
Diamond, 2008, 2009). 
The EPS run by the EPFO sustained large actuarial deficit in the EPS over the past decade. The latest 
report of the Expert Committee on the Employees' Pension Scheme suggests that the actuarial deficit 
in 2006 was INR 226bn, and this will increase substantially, if the current contribution rates and 
investment returns are maintained, while benefits are increased as a result of inflation indexing 
(Government of India, 2010). Similarly, the EPF announces its annual dividend (the administered 
interest rate it will credit on member provident fund balances) ahead of the close of the fiscal year. 
Both these practices are deleterious to the sustainability of the pension arrangements. 
Administrative and operational level 
Central to the NPS architecture is the extensive use of information technology and centralized 
recordkeeping, which has enabled portability of pension benefits. This is a significant achievement as 
under the EPFO framework individuals maintained multiple accounts resulting from changes in their 
employment, thereby increasing transaction costs. Moreover, centralized recordkeeping allows 
harnessing both economies of scale and scope and may further reduce administrative costs. 
As fund managers of NPS are no longer constrained by regulation to maintain similar investment 
portfolios and can vary asset class exposure across funds, this allows fund managers to compete for 




As discussed earlier, the fiscal challenges of the civil service pension scheme and lack of 
arrangements for the informal sector were primary drivers that precipitated the NPS reforms in 2004. 
As newly recruited civil servants are placed on the NPS, over time, the current liabilities of the 
erstwhile-unfunded DB scheme will reduce. The voluntary co-contribution scheme, with portability of 
benefits, has improved informal sector coverage. The adequacy of these arrangements however will 
depend on the density of contributions into the NPS by its members. The two main challenges the 
NPS face, from a systemic perspective of safeguarding old-age income security in India and to 
achieve universal coverage, relates to expanding coverage to those employed in the formal private 
sector, as well as provide income security for the informal poor, through social pensions. 
As NPS aggressively explores avenues to expand coverage to the formal private sector, it is 
encumbered by the EPFO, whose membership is compulsory. The EPFO is a large self-perpetuating 
organization with over 20 000 employees administering a highly inefficient and ineffective pension 
scheme. It has an unwieldy governing board of 45 members with limited access to expertise in 
pension economics or finance. Its financial decisions are heavily politicized and have resulted in large 
actuarial deficits in the EPS (Government of India, 2010). These deficits can be overcome only by 
increasing the contribution rate or by reducing benefits or by improving investment performance or a 
combination of all. The former are not politically feasible, and the latter is not economically possible 
given its investment portfolio is in entirely in fixed-income securities. If members are given an option 
to choose between the EPFO and the voluntary component of the NPS, it reduces the monopoly power 
of the EPFO and will could benefit its members. 
Extending social security coverage to the informal sector is challenging even in advanced economies 
(Holzmann et al., 2009). Although the co-contributory voluntary NPS has been well received, the 
total assets accumulated so far are relatively low. While the share of those employed in the informal 
sector accounted for 40 per cent of NPS members, their share in total balances was less than 2 per 
cent. Therefore, the need for targeted non-contributory transfers or social pensions merits 
consideration to help mitigate old-age income poverty (Pal and Palacios, 2011; Asher, 2012; 
Barrientos, 2012). The current benefit levels of social pensions are too low for them to meaningfully 
mitigate old-age income poverty. However, governments across developing countries remain 
skeptical of implementing social pension schemes as they are thought to be prohibitively expensive. 
What would the fiscal cost of a universal social pension be? Table 1 presents estimated fiscal costs of 
a hypothetical universal social pension scheme under the following assumptions. First, the scheme is 
not means tested and is universal to all Indian nationals older than age 60, 65, or 80 years. Second, the 
GDP is projected to grow in real terms at 6 per cent per annum. Third, the benefit level for variant A 
is 15 per cent per capita income, and 25 per cent per capita income in variant B.20 Fourth, the 
projections do not include any administrative or transaction costs. Fifth, the estimates do not take into 
account differences between rural and urban income levels, and demographic data uses the medium 
variant of the United Nations Population Forecast. 
The direct fiscal costs vary according to the benefit level and the number of beneficiaries. A targeted 
or means-tested scheme would be cheaper as the number of beneficiaries would be smaller; however, 
it may have higher administrative costs. Another option is to make the social pension taxable at 
certain income levels to gain a claw back. The purpose of this estimation is to meaningfully engage 
with the debate on extending social protection to the informal poor and to suggest that it is not 
prohibitively expensive. 
The political economy of social policy reform holds valuable implications. Ramesh (2000), building 
on regime survival theories, has argued that governments increase social spending when they perceive 
threats to their regimes in a contestable society. This resonates with the social policy reform 
experiences in India. Over the past decade at key electoral junctures, India has committed (through 
Acts of Parliament) to pay for generous rural workfare and food security programs in excess of the 
conservative estimates in Table 1 (Bhalla, 2013; Jha and Gaiha, 2013).21 This suggests that the issue is 
more political than constrained by fiscal capacities. The elderly poor are not a cohesive group that are 
able to galvanize political support to advance their interests. The government is more focused on 
palpable electoral problems such as health, food security, and education. 
Any major national pension reform is a complex and challenging endeavor. It is important to 
underscore that buy-in for the NPS was secured from state governments as it reduced their future 
fiscal costs and from unions immediately as it was only applicable to future employees. The only 
political opposition to it stemmed from left-of-center members of the incumbent coalition 
government, which did not agree with unfettered exposure to equity funds and doing away with the 
government guarantee. The efficacy of India's pension reforms lies in the extent to which it can 
overcome the EPFO and attract private formal sector employees and galvanize political support to 
finance the social pension scheme. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As India prepares to finance the retirement expenditure of its elderly (100 million in 2010 and 
projected to increase to 300 million in 2050), it will need a robust and modern pension system, which 
integrates programs for both public and private sector workers and the informal sectors. The NPS is a 
step in the right direction: Its design incorporates the best practices in pension economics and finance. 
Efforts to expand coverage are largely encumbered by the EPFO and low accumulation of funds in the 
targeted government co-contributory NPS schemes for the informal poor. To this extent, there is merit 
in considering a social pension to be introduced as part of the NPS architecture. Progress on this front 
maybe stymied for political rather than fiscal reasons. Avenues to generate fiscal space to finance 
these social pensions also need to be part of the public policy debate on pension reforms in India. 
1. Other programs such as microfinance and community-based insurance cover a negligible share of the 
population. Shankar and Asher (2011) and Sadhak (2013) discuss these individual programs at length. 
2. The Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) Act permits an organization to seek exemption 
from the EPF scheme of the EPFO, provided it follows the regulation set by the EPFO, including at least 
the same level of dividend declared by the EPFO. 
3. As at August 2013, $1 = 60 INR. 
4. Employees that leave the government service before reaching the institutional retirement age are eligible 
to receive a reduced pension benefit, which varies with the number of years in service. 
5. Estimated from RBI (2012): Table 1, 112; and Government of India (2013a) 
6. Gratuity is a benefit paid out to civil servants and employees of public sector organizations at retirement 
or on completing a minimum number of years of service. It is governed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 
1972. As of October 2013, the maximum gratuity payable was INR 1m. 
7. The political opposition was from left of center parties, which did not agree with investing pension 
funds in equity markets, and moving away from a government guaranteed return on member balances 
(Dave, 2006; Asher, 2009; Government of India, 2011). 
8. The scheme was extended on a voluntary basis to all Indian nationals in 2009. This is discussed further 
in the succeeding texts. 
9. The lump sum withdrawal may be deferred by 10 years, and the annuity purchase by 3 years. 
10. The program's website is http://nsap.nic.in/. 
11. The aforementioned text are static costs; once demographic, behavioral, and political economy 
considerations are taken into account, the costs are likely to rise. 
12. Formal private sector workers constituted less than 5 percent of total National Pension System 
membership. 
13. See OECD Policy Initiative for Development 
– http://www.oecd.org/pcd/publicationseriesthedevelopmentdimension.htm (Accessed, April 5, 2014) 
14. Moreover, the framework does not consider other age-related expenditure such as healthcare, which can 
erode the real value of pension income and undermine old-age income security. This is particularly 
important in many developing countries where healthcare expenditure is financed, privately without risk 
pooling, largely through out of pocket spending. 
15. This is important as social security not only represents a social contract between the state and its citizens 
but also has many macroeconomic impacts. 
16. In other advanced economies, civil service programs are being reformed to lower the fiscal cost to the 
exchequer. See IPSPC (2011) for a discussion of the Hutton Commission's recommendations to reform 
civil service pension arrangements in the UK. 
17. The Employees Provident Fund Organization, through its parent organization, the Ministry of Labour, 
had lobbied the Ministry of Finance to be the agency implementing both the recommendations of project 
Old Age Social and Income Security and the National Pension System . However, this proposal was 
dismissed as the architects of the National Pension System argued that the Employees Provident Fund 
Organization did not have the requisite capacity to deliver such punctuating reform (Dave, 2006). 
18. As the membership number of 85.5 million reported appears overstated because of multiple accounts 
and inactive members, the average balance would be higher (EPFO, 2012). It will however still be quite 
inadequate to contribute significantly to retirement income. 
19. The statistical tables in Government of India (2013c) provide a break up of India's labor force by 
occupation. 
20. As the benefit level is indexed to share of per capita gross domestic product, it aims to mitigate relative 
and not absolute poverty. 
21. The oldest political party in India, the Indian National Congress, has been in power in most 49 out of 67 
years of India's independence. It last lost the central elections in 1996, to return to power in 2004. It 
consequently won the 2009 central elections. 
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Table 1. Estimated fiscal costs of a hypothetical universal social pension 
 
 
 Variant A (15%) (years)   Variant B (25%) (years)   
   >60 >65   >80 >60 >65 >80 
2015   1.38 0.86   0.13 2.31 1.44 0.21 
2020   1.65 1.05   0.25 2.74 1.75 0.26 
2025   1.93 1.26   0.18 3.22 2.1 0.3 
2030   2.24 1.48   0.21 3.73 2.47 0.34 
 
